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A Core of Agreement 
Donald Braman,† Dan M. Kahan,†† & David Hoffman‡ 
We are deeply gratified by this exchange with Professors John Dar-
ley, Paul Robinson, Owen Jones, and Robert Kurzban. We have benefit-
ted a great deal from their research, and this encounter only adds to our 
appreciation. Their work has always been exceptional in its devotion to 
empirical exploration and experimentation. We are grateful to them for 
taking the time to share their thoughts with us and with the readers of 
this journal. In responding, we are unsurprised to find that we are in 
agreement with quite a bit of what they have to say.  
Indeed, there is very little that we can find in the nuanced and 
learned account that John Darley individually presents that is incon-
sistent with our conception of Punishment Realism. As we understand 
him, he also rejects most of what we found most objectionable in the 
accounts of Punishment Naturalism that we criticize. What one perce-
ives to be right or wrong—and precisely how right or wrong one 
perceives it to be—will depend in large part on socialization, which 
can vary culturally.
1
 Through this socialization process, individuals de-
velop very speedy moral evaluations that are consistent with norms in 
their culture.
2
 These rapid intuitions can, as he notes, be countered 
through conscious reflection and reasoning,
3
 but this type of critical 
reflection is difficult to prompt, and our intuitions can be quite diffi-
cult to revise. The cognitive mechanisms on which people draw to 
make moral assessments are highly uniform across individuals; but the 
content of those assessments varies across groups and within them 
over time as a result of local social influences.
4
 Darley’s is an account 
that we embrace as entirely consistent with Punishment Realism as we 
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 1 John Darley, Realism on Change in Moral Intuitions, 77 U Chi L Rev 1643, 1648 (2010). 
 2 Id at 1643 (quoting our original article with approval on this point). 
 3 Id at 1644–45. 
 4 See, for example, id at 1652. 
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describe it—indeed, it is an admirably sophisticated and clear concep-
tion that improves our own understanding.  
We agree, too, with Paul Robinson, Owen Jones, and Robert 
Kurzban (RJK) in their insistence that the empirical evidence reveals 
“not just disagreements about relative blameworthiness, but also 
about whether the conduct should even be criminal.”
5 And we are 
heartened that, in their separate article, Jones and Kurzban share our 
“opposition to genetic determinism, [our] commitment to plasticity in 
human cognition, and a deep (in fact scientifically unavoidable) com-
mitment to recognizing the crucial role that social environment plays 
in each individual’s development of intuitions of justice.”
6
  
But the core of our agreement with them has a clear and definite 
periphery. As RJK now clearly explain, they used a method carefully 
designed to exclude from measurement any “aspects” of “core” of-
fenses on which there is demographic or cultural disagreement.
7
 Ac-
cordingly, we simply disagree with them when they assert that their 
work has important implications for criminal law reformers.  
Here is what they say:  
What is the “core”? [Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman (BKH)] sug-
gest that its contours are quite vague and difficult to identify, but 
what constitutes the “core” is not a matter of speculation or 
theory, or even of interpretation. It is a matter of empirics. The 
“core” is, by definition, that on which there is high agreement 
across demographics, like that demonstrated in the C&C agree-
ment study.  
What cases are included in the core? Those cases on which there 
is high agreement across demographics. . . . 
What aspects of these offenses are included in the core? BKH 
seem to assume that we claim that all aspects, all cases, involving 
any of these offenses are part of the core, but this could hardly be 
the situation. Our research used factors upon which we judged 
there was high agreement. To the extent that one substitutes a 
factor on which there is disagreement, obviously the level of 
agreement on the relative seriousness of the case would have to 
decline. . . . 
. . . 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Paul H. Robinson, Owen D. Jones, and Robert Kurzban, Realism, Punishment, and 
Reform, 77 U Chi L Rev 1611, 1619 (2010). 
 6 Owen D. Jones and Robert Kurzban, Intuitions of Punishment, 77 U Chi L Rev 1633, 
1634 (2010). 
 7 Robinson, Jones, and Kurzban, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1616–18 (cited in note 5).  
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The point of C&C’s Appendix B is to show the reader just how 
we were able to construct the twenty-four scenarios on which our 
subjects had such high agreement: by relying upon, and only 
upon, principles that we knew were deeply embedded intuitions 
of near unanimity. . . . 
As you can imagine, we found the BKH article quite difficult to 
understand, given its false assumptions about our claims. For ex-
ample, it has an entire section showing disagreements in cases of 
deception in exchanges. Whether somebody is deceived in an ex-
change obviously is a function of one’s expectations about the 
terms of the exchange, and those expectations could be highly 
culturally dependent or, even within a culture, highly dependent 
on context. The case we used in the study was one of a store clerk 
shortchanging a customer. We used it precisely because it seemed 
to us that such shortchanging offered an example of a violation 




As we emphasized in our article—and as RJK now say is “ob-
viously” correct—people of diverse identities (within and across socie-
ties) are intensely divided about whether certain conspicuous, recur-
ring forms of behavior count as instances of the offenses that punish 
core criminal wrongdoing.
9
 In the United States, for example, there are 
intense cultural divisions on whether battered women who kill their 
husbands in their sleep, or “true men” who stand their ground and kill 
attackers when they could easily flee, are murderers;
10
 whether male 
college students (and others) who persist in engaging in intercourse 
with a woman who repeatedly and emphatically objects are rapists;
11
 
and whether squatters have property rights
12
 or digital versions of 
songs can be shared among friends.
13
 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Id. 
 9 Id at 1621. RJK pose various empirical “challenges” to us, see id at 1622–23, but those 
have no connection to the only empirical point we are making: there is significant cultural 
variation, and resulting political conflict, over what count as instances of offense types in-
cluded in the RJK core. We stand by the evidence in our article on that. See Donald Braman, 
Dan M. Kahan, and David Hoffman, Some Realism about Punishment Naturalism, 77 U Chi L 
Rev 1531, 1566–93 (2010). 
 10 See Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1581–93 (cited in note 9). 
 11 Id at 1574–75. 
 12 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse 
Possession, 100 Nw U L Rev 1037 (2006). 
 13 See Alain d’Astous, François Colbert, and Daniel Montpetit, Music Piracy on the Web: 
How Effective Are Anti-piracy Arguments? Evidence from the Theory of Planned Behaviour, 28 J 
Consumer Policy 289, 305–07 (2005). 
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RJK unconvincingly try to deflect this argument by suggesting 
that the work we rely on shows the influence of cultural variation only 
in “justificatory norms” as opposed to “prohibitory” ones.
14
 But as the 
work of Mark Alicke has shown, people tend to conform their percep-
tions of the various components of culpable behavior—such as voli-
tion, action, causation, and harm—to social norms extrinsic to those 
concepts.
15
 It follows that people with different norms, even when they 
agree about what conduct is morally blameworthy (or otherwise wor-
thy of “prohibition”) generally, will systematically disagree about what 
counts as an instance of that conduct. Our work on cultural cognition 
seeks to identify the particular norms that make the most conspicuous 
contribution to this form of motivated perception and hence to the 
highly politicized disputes we see in law and society generally over 
who should be blamed for wrongdoing and when.
 16
 
RJK’s “core” definitely measures something on which diverse 
people agree. But because their methods deliberately exclude from the 
specification of “core” offense types precisely those “aspects” of them 
that provoke cultural dispute about what counts as murder, rape, and 
fraud, the construct they measure cannot predict or explain who sees 
what as wrong (indeed, criminally wrong) and why in the real world.  
For the same reason, what they are measuring when they find a 
“core” of agreement has no normative or prescriptive consequence. 
Whether the fact of “a high level of agreement” is treated as evidence 
of an act’s wrongfulness or simply recognized as a political constraint 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Robinson, Jones, and Kurzban, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1620 (cited in note 5). 
 15 See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J Personality & Soc Psych 368 
(1992); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 Psych Bull 556 (2000). 
 16 See, for example, Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose Eyes 
Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv L Rev 
837, 879–80 (2009) (identifying values that generate systematic disagreement about the culpabili-
ty of a driver seeking to evade police in a high-speed chase); Dan M. Kahan and Donald Bra-
man, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 Am Crim L Rev 1, 44–46 (2008) (identify-
ing how values shape perceptions of intent and other facts relevant to determining liability for 
homicide); Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in 
Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U Pa L Rev 729, 793–95 (2010) (identifying values that motivate 
different groups to perceive use of force or intimidation and lack of consent in sexual assault 
cases); Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, and John Gastil, A Cultural Critique of Gun Litigation, 
in Timothy D. Lytton, ed, Suing the Gun Industry [QQ, QQ] (Michigan 2006) (describing the role 
of varied perceptions of causation in shaping intutions about harms underlying litigation against 
the gun industry). In a paper coauthored with Avani Mehta Sood, Darley, too, has recently ex-
amined the role that motivated reasoning plays in generating disagreements about harm among 
persons with different values. See Avani Mehta Sood and John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm: 
An Experimental Demonstration of the Malleability of Judgments in the Service of Criminaliza-
tion *15–19 (unpublished manuscript, July 2010) online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641022 
(visited Oct 24, 2010). We thank John Mikhail for bringing our attention to this during his excep-
tionally enlightening seminar. 
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on the possibility of reform,
17
 the fact remains that the kind of “agree-
ment” RJK measure lacks sufficient connection to live controversies 
to matter in either of these ways. The admonition that one should not 
undertake reform in any area where there is “consensus” (regardless 
of whether it involves murder, rape, torture, theft, fraud, or anything 
else) is simply beside the point, because there is not consensus on the 
sorts of issues that are at the practical core of efforts to evaluate and 
reform criminal law in American society.
18
  
We agree, in short, that RJK are talking about something other 
than what we and many other academic and political commentators 
are talking about. The whole point of our article was to make this un-
mistakably clear, lest anyone think that Punishment Naturalism sup-
plies a reason either to doubt the reality of profound political conflict 
over the content of the criminal law in our society or to resist particu-
lar positions about how that conflict should be resolved. We are glad 
that RJK acknowledge this point.  
Still, in response to their bafflement about why it would even seem 
necessary for us to make it, we note that the RJK response itself risks 
perpetuating the sort of overreading of their work that we warned 
against. To rebut the charge of conservatism, RJK insist that their “pro-
gram is designed to give reformers tools for more effective reform.”
19
 
These “tools” consist of pieces of advice such as “it may often be unwise 
to invest limited reform resources on trying to change intuitions of jus-
tice that will be difficult to change,”
20
 and “when developing a program 
to change people’s intuitions of justice, it will often be a better invest-
ment to harness people’s core intuitions of justice rather than fight 
them.”
21
 But to whom exactly are they addressing this prudential coun-
sel? Presumably it cannot be anyone, for example, who is currently pro-
posing reforms relating to “aspects”
22 of murder, rape, and theft on 
which there is cultural dissensus, for RJK insist there is nothing in their 
research that speaks to such issues. Yet, in fact, they proceed to draw a 
“conclusion” from their work for those who want to reform rape law to 
combat the contested norm that “no means yes”: avoid a “strict liabili-
ty” standard lest the conflict between law and “internalized norms” 
cause “defendants . . . [to] be seen as blameless” and vitiate the “moral 
credibility” of law generally.
23
 Can they really be surprised if readers 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Robinson, Jones, and Kurzban, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1613 (cited in note 5). 
 18 See Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1534–35 (cited in note 9). 
 19 Robinson, Jones, and Kurzban, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1628 (cited in note 5). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id at 1617. 
 23 Robinson, Jones, and Kurzban, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1629 (cited in note 5). 
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(and not just us, as we pointed out in our article
24
) see their work as 
evincing resistance to reform on culturally disputed issues when they 
themselves read their work that way? 
But we will not dwell on the possibilities for misunderstanding 
that persist. Instead, let us offer our own advice to would-be reformers 
of the criminal law. 
First and foremost, contemporary debates in criminal law are 
characterized by dissensus over what deserves—and what should 
comprise—punishment. If you are involved in such a debate over tor-
ture, rape, self-defense, intellectual property, eminent domain, con-
sumer fraud protection, or any other contentious legal issue, if you are 
an advocate for reform, or if you feel the law is unjust, you should be 
utterly undissuaded from attempting to reform the law by any notion 
that the content of the current law reflects a universal or innate intui-
tion about justice.  
Second, any attempt at legal reform is likely to be quite difficult 
and culturally fraught. The difficulty, however, has little to do with an 
innate “moral organ,”
25
 and everything to do with the cultural signific-
ance that those on both sides of the debate invest in the law. Recogni-
tion of the unavoidable connection between the law’s position in such 
conflicts and the status of contested visions of the good life should 
make you circumspect about the prospects of reform. It should also 
make you anxious when assessing the proper scope for norm-shaping 
in a liberal society and intent on discovering means for avoiding cul-
tural domination and accommodating difference. 
Third, and finally, nothing about the innate structure of our minds 
will absolve you of the hard work of determining what should popu-
late the categories of offenses that we condemn and punish, or assess-
ing what the law will convey about the status of the communities to 
which it speaks. Intuition is often a poor guide for understanding the 
motivation and reasoning of those who oppose the social reordering 
you desire. Understanding and overcoming opposition in culturally 
contested battles over the law is profoundly difficult work, but it is 
also deeply important work. 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1603–05 (cited in note 9). 
 25 See id at 1539–40. 
